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Introduction 
 The purpose of this honors thesis is to argue for interactionist dualism, the view that 
mental entities do not metaphysically supervene on physical entities and that they have causal 
efficacy in the physical world. This thesis is opposed to two theories. First, it denies 
epiphenomenalism, the idea that mental entities are effects but not causes. Second, and most 
importantly, it rejects physicalism. There is no consensus about the definition of physicalism, but 
most people agree that physicalism at least entails that mental entities metaphysically supervene 
on physical entities (the notion of supervenience is further discussed below). This honors thesis 
argues against this necessary condition of physicalism. 
 David Chalmers advocates for naturalistic dualism and is very positive toward Russellian 
panprotopsychism. Naturalistic dualism is a version of dualism that claims that the mental 
naturally, though not metaphysically, supervenes on the physical, and it does not commit to 
either epiphenomenalism or interactionist dualism. Russellian panprotopsychism is the view that 
there is a single kind of intrinsic, categorical feature of both physical and phenomenal properties, 
and this feature is called proto-phenomenal property for its similarity to phenomenal properties, 
though explanatorily speaking, proto-phenomenal properties are fundamental and give rise to 
phenomenal properties (as well as physical properties). Even though this theory is a form of 
monism, Chalmers argues that it is quite different from physicalism (Chalmers 1996:155). 
Essentially, Chalmers regards naturalistic dualism and panprotopsychism as compatible and tries 
to insert the theories as the middle ground among interactionist dualism, epiphenomenalism, and 
physicalism. 
 This thesis consists of two parts. In Part 1 I explain why we should endorse an 
interactionist version of dualism instead of other kinds of anti-physicalism. I argue that 
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epiphenomenalism is false, and as versions of anti-physicalism, naturalistic dualism and 
Russellian panprotopsychism fail to find the middle ground between interactionist dualism and 
epiphenomenalism. John Perry (2001) and Andrew Bailey (2006) have accused Chalmers of 
presupposing epiphenomenalism. I develop their attack based on the causal closure problem and 
reply to Chalmers’ responses. In particular, I evaluate Chalmers’ defense of Russellian 
panprotopsychism and argue that this theory as well cannot avoid committing to either 
interactionist dualism or epiphenomenalism. In Part 2 I provide an interactionist argument 
against physicalism by constructing a possible world which is only partially physically identical 
to the actual world. I then give an account of what mental causation in the interactionist dualist 
picture might look like and address some objections against interactionist dualism and the 
interactionist argument. 
 
Part 1: Why Interactionist Dualism? 
The Logical Space of the Causal Closure Problem 
 The causal closure problem can be roughly formulated as follows, “Given that every 
physical event that has a cause has a physical cause, how is a mental cause also possible?” (Kim 
1998:38) On the surface, we need to reconcile two seemingly contradicting claims. On one hand, 
we have strong evidence for what is called the completeness of physics, the thesis that every 
physical effect is fully caused by previous physical occurrences. On the other hand, it is very 
intuitive that our consciousness, or our mental activities, plays a causal role in our physical life. 
If we further take two other views, that physical effects are not overdetermined by both mental 
and physical causes, and that mental properties are not physical and do not supervene on the 
physical, we have four logically incompatible claims: 
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a. Every physical effect is fully caused by previous physical occurrences. (the completeness 
of physics) 
b. Mental properties have physical effects. (the negation of epiphenomenalism) 
c. Physical effects are not overdetermined by both mental and physical causes. (no 
overdetermination) 
d. Mental properties are not physical and do not supervene on physical properties. (dualism) 
Again, (c) claims that physical effects only have one sufficient cause at a given time. (b) 
claims that physical effects can have mental causes, while (a) claims that physical effects always 
have physical causes. (d) states that mental properties are different from physical properties, and 
therefore mental causes are not the same as physical causes. These four claims are clearly 
incompatible. If every physical effect is guaranteed a physical cause, and it is allowed only one 
cause, then there is no room for mental causes which are not, or do not supervene on, physical 
causes. Many physicalists find it most sensible to reject (d), claiming that mental properties are 
ultimately physical or supervene on the physical (but of course, a physicalist does not have to 
accept (b) or (c)).  
 
Epiphenomenalism 
 To be a dualist means to accept (d), and a property dualist has to deny one of the first 
three propositions. Among the options, to deny (b) is to accept epiphenomenalism, which denies 
that mental properties have causal efficacy in the physical world. While this is certainly not 
impossible, many philosophers reject it as counterintuitive. For example, John Perry offers an 
example of him eating a delicious cookie, having the wonderful phenomenal experience of the 
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taste and exclaiming “Boy, was that good!” Perry claims that “I find it simply incredible—not 
inconceivable, but really quite incredible—that the conscious event was not part of the cause of 
my saying what I did” (Perry 2001:74).  
 Andrew Bailey (2006) offers three arguments against epiphenomenalism, and the one I 
find most convincing is the reporting problem, that epiphenomenalism seems incompatible with 
the self-reporting of consciousness. “If consciousness is epiphenomenal then it has no effects; in 
particular, it has no effects on those organisms whose consciousness it is” (Bailey 2006:494). If 
this is true, then my experience of pain does not cause, and is completely causally irrelevant to 
my utterance of “my leg hurts,” which seems highly unlikely.  
 It is noteworthy that Chalmers has responded to an epistemological problem of 
epiphenomenalism, which is similar to, but essentially different from the reporting problem. 
According to Chalmers, the most influential form of this problem is raised by Sydney Shoemaker 
(1975). The problem states that if mental states are not physical and do not have causal efficacy, 
then they do not cause our beliefs about them; but if our beliefs about our mental states are not 
caused by our mental properties, we are not justified in having those beliefs; therefore, either 
mental states have causal efficacy, or we are not justified in having beliefs about our mental 
states.  In response to this challenge, Chalmers denies the causal theory of knowledge, at least as 
it applies to our knowledge of our mental states. The causal theory of knowledge claims that the 
justification for believing p requires a causal relation between the fact that p and the belief that p. 
Chalmers contends that this causal relation is not a necessary condition. Rather, justification in 
the case of mental beliefs requires only that we be directly acquainted with the mental states. 
I do not go into details about this response because, even if this is true, it only accounts 
for the justification of beliefs about mental states but fails to explain what causes the beliefs in 
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the first place. To make sure we are talking about a physical effect here, the final effect is the 
physical utterance of the sentence “my leg hurts,” which is presumably caused by my belief 
about my mental state of my leg hurting. Even granted that the justification for having the belief 
is not causal, this physical effect still needs to be caused. Whereas the utterance is, at least 
partially, caused by the belief, the belief seems to be caused by the mental state. Therefore, the 
reporting problem seems to pose a real problem for epiphenomenalism, and to deal with the 
causal closure, rejecting (b) would not be a reasonable move for dualist if there are better options.  
 
Overdetermination 
 For dualists, an apparent way to avoid epiphenomenalism is to deny (c) (no 
overdetermination) instead. If physical effects are overdetermined by mental properties and 
physical properties, then even if epiphenomenalism is false, the causal efficacy of mental 
properties and the completeness of physics can then coexist. It is noteworthy that (c) is a strong 
statement that claims there are no cases of overdetermination at all. Generally, people reject 
systematic overdetermination, since this seems like a coincidence that has too small a probability 
to be considered seriously. However, it is not clear we have any reason to deny all cases of 
overdetermination. After all, overdetermination is perfectly possible and some random cases of it 
do not seem to face the same problem as systematic overdetermination does. Therefore, if we can 
find just one random case of overdetermination, then it seems we have successfully disproved (c).   
 This seems a possible solution to the causal closure problem, but upon closer inspection, 
simply introducing some random cases of overdetermination does not help. Suppose a dualist 
wants to solve the problem with this method without admitting epiphenomenalism or rejecting 
completeness. Since completeness is still true, one has to maintain that all physical effects of 
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causally efficacious mental properties have sufficient physical causes as well. If this is true, then 
mental properties would be “causally irrelevant in that their presence or absence makes no 
difference to how everything (non-phenomenal) goes in the world,” which Bailey labels as 
“quepiphenomenalism” (Bailey 2006:488). However, “the problems [with quepiphenomenalism] 
arise because of the implausibility of supposing that the elimination of consciousness would 
make no difference at all to how things go in the physical world” (ibid.). This argument adopts 
the same, though a stronger, intuition as Bailey and Perry did when refuting epiphenomenalism, 
stronger in the sense that it claims that mental properties have to make a difference to the 
physical world, instead of just having causal efficacy. To use overdetermination, random or 
systematic, as a way out is to claim that removing any mental properties has no physical effects 
at all, which is as unlikely. Therefore, random or systematic overdetermination alone cannot 
solve the causal closure problem. As a dualist who rejects epiphenomenalism, one has to deny 
the completeness of physics. 
   
The Zombie Argument 
 Chalmers is known for his zombie argument for dualism. Philosophical zombies are 
supposedly possible beings which are physically identical to humans, but which have no mental 
experience. Chalmers develops the zombie argument in his (1996) book The Conscious Mind. 
The argument goes roughly as follows:  
1. Zombies are conceivable.  
2. Whatever is conceivable is metaphysically possible.  
3. Therefore zombies are metaphysically possible.  
4. If zombies are metaphysically possible, then dualism is true. 
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5. Therefore, dualism is true. 
 Again, physicalism entails that mental entities metaphysically supervene on physical 
entities. When I use “supervenience” in this essay I mean strong supervenience, for which 
Jaegwon Kim gives the following definition: “let A and B be families of properties…, A strongly 
supervenes on B just in case, necessarily, for each x and each property F in A, if x has F, then 
there is a property G in B such that x has G, and necessarily if any y has G, it has F” (1984:164-
5). Simply speaking, physicalism is true in a world only if, necessarily, whenever a mental 
property, M, is instantiated, there is also a physical property, P, that is instantiated in the same 
entity, and necessarily, whenever P is instantiated, M is also instantiated in the same entity. The 
zombie argument, however, tries to show that it is possible that the same physical properties as in 
the actual world are instantiated but mental properties are not, from which follows that in the 
actual world, mental properties do not supervene on physical properties. If this is true, then 
mental properties are fundamental, and property dualism is true.  
 Perry and Bailey accuse the zombie argument, rightfully in my view, of denying (b) and 
accepting epiphenomenalism. A zombie world is supposed to be physically identical to the actual 
world, and therefore zombies are possible only if removing mental properties from humans has 
no physical consequences. This already sounds a lot like epiphenomenalism. On a simple 
inspection, it is difficult to deny epiphenomenalism while accepting the possibility of zombie 
worlds. As Perry asks, “[i]f conscious states make a difference in the way our bodies work and 
ultimately in how we behave, and they are absent in the zombie world, then how could 
everything in the physical world be the same as it is in our world?” (2001:73). Similarly, Bailey 
argues that if zombie world is possible, then “on the face of it, consciousness is not required for 
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everything to happen in the actual world just as it does, and so consciousness is radically 
epiphenomenal (in the actual world)” (Bailey 2006:488). 
 I have been talking above about why epiphenomenalism is a bad choice for dualists, 
making an interactionist dualism very desirable. However, this also means that dualists have to 
deny the completeness of physics, a thesis that is widely accepted. Chalmers seems convinced by 
the evidence that supports the completeness of physics (1996:125), and in order to avoid 
rejecting completeness or committing to epiphenomenalism, Chalmers tries to expand the logical 
space of the causal closure problem. 
 
Chalmers’ Solution 1 
In his review of John Perry’s book, Chalmers offers two possible ways to avoid 
epiphenomenalism in the zombie argument without rejecting the completeness of physics: 
… [A]n interactionist dualist can accept the possibility of zombies, by accepting 
the possibility of physically identical worlds in which physical causal gaps go 
unfilled, or are filled by something other than mental processes. The first 
possibility would have many unexplained physical events, but there is nothing 
metaphysically impossible about unexplained physical events. Also: a Russellian 
"panprotopsychist", who holds that consciousness is constituted by the unknown 
intrinsic categorical bases of microphysical dispositions, can accept the possibility 
of zombies by accepting the possibility of worlds in which the microphysical 
dispositions have a different categorical basis, or none at all.  (Chalmers 2004:184) 
The first method states that we might be able to stipulate the zombie world to be 
physically identical to the actual world. Suppose (just for the sake of argument and brevity) that 
pain causes me to yell in the actual world. In the zombie world, we can stipulate that I yell at the 
same time and in the same manner as I do in the actual world, only that my yelling is not caused 
by anything, or caused by something other than mental or physical properties (maybe an alien 
type of property). With this solution, it seems that we can construct a possible zombie world that 
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is physically identical to the actual world, but on a closer look, as Chalmers changes the cause of 
the physical effects (me yelling), the physical laws in the zombie world would be different from 
those in the actual world.  In the same paper as above, Bailey elaborates on Chalmers’ defense: 
Suppose we elect not to fill the causal gaps but simply stipulate that the physical 
events continue to occur as they do in the target world. This cannot be done 
without changing the physics. As Chalmers himself is often at pains to point out, 
the characterization of the physical is structural and relational; what makes an 
electron an electron, as far as the physical sciences are concerned, is the way it is 
embedded in a set of law-like causal relationships with other entities…. [I]t is 
impossible for two physical events, one connected by natural laws to other event-
types and the other not so connected and hence 'unexplained,' to be the same 
physical event (i.e. members of the same physical event-type). (Bailey 2006:493) 
 Here Bailey adopts a specific view, that structural and relational properties are both 
essential for the identity of the physical. An electron is not an electron if it does not have the 
same causal relationship with other charged entities. The causal efficacy of an electron 
determines its identity. This view is also supported by Chalmers himself. If this is true, then it 
seems that the zombie world is not physically identical to the actual world if one chooses to try 
to stipulate that the physical facts in the zombie world are the same as those in the actual world, 
while some physical events that are caused by physical events in actual world are uncaused (or 
caused by alien properties) in the zombie world. In the actual world some physical events stand 
in causal relationships with the mental, whereas in the zombie world they stand in causal 
relationships with something else or even nothing. The zombie argument only works when it 
proves the possibility to have the same physical properties without having the same mental 
properties. Bailey’s argument, if sound, shows that Chalmers fails to construct a zombie world 
where the same physical properties as in the actual world are instantiated.  
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Chalmers’ Solution 2: Russellian Panprotopsychism 
The other method suggested by Chalmers is to be a Russellian "panprotopsychist." On 
this view, “consciousness is closely tied to the intrinsic properties that serve as the categorical 
bases of microphysical dispositions” (Chalmers 2010:151). One of the motivations for this idea 
is that if physical properties are just relational properties, then the world seems “strangely 
insubstantial” (Chalmers 1996:153). Therefore, it seems reasonable to suppose that there are 
intrinsic properties of the physical as the “categorical basis,” and the relational or causal 
properties relate these intrinsic bases. The only intrinsic properties we really know of are 
phenomenal properties. Since it is better to give a simple, unified explanation of both the 
physical and the mental, a way to achieve this is to posit a proto-phenomenal feature that is the 
categorical feature of both physical and mental properties. As Chalmers notes, “[i]t is natural to 
speculate that there may be some relation or even overlap between the uncharacterized intrinsic 
properties of physical entities, and the familiar intrinsic properties of experience” (1996:154) On 
this view, proto-phenomenal features “give rise to” or “aggregate to” phenomenal properties that 
we know of, and combined with causal, relational features, they together give rise to or aggregate 
to physical properties.  
With this theory, Chalmers tries to make room for the causal efficacy of mental while 
remaining committed to the completeness of physics: 
If there are intrinsic properties of the physical, it is instantiations of these 
properties that physical causation ultimately relates. If these are phenomenal 
properties, then there is phenomenal causation; and if these are protophenomenal 
properties, then phenomenal properties inherit causal relevance by their 
supervenient status, just as billiard balls inherit causal relevance from 
molecules… 
 …the intrinsic properties should not be identified with physical properties such as 
mass. It seems reasonable to say that there is still mass in the zombie world, 
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despite differences in its intrinsic nature. If so, then mass is an extrinsic property 
that can be ‘realized’ by different intrinsic properties in different worlds. (ibid.)  
The causal efficacy of mental properties is presented as follows: events of physical 
causation causally relate two instantiations of the categorical bases of the physical, i.e. proto-
phenomenal properties. Because one of the relata of causation is the cause, proto-phenomenal 
properties are then causally efficacious in that they can cause the instantiations of other proto-
phenomenal properties. Since phenomenal, or mental, properties derive from proto-phenomenal 
properties, they inherit the causal efficacy of the proto-phenomenal properties.  
The next step is to apply this picture to the zombie argument. What Chalmers needs is to 
establish that the physical world can remain the same in the zombie world. On the surface, when 
you remove all phenomenal properties, what you essentially remove is their categorical bases, i.e. 
proto-phenomenal properties, but when the proto-phenomenal properties are removed, then there 
seems to be no categorical basis for physical properties. Chalmers argues that some alien type of 
intrinsic properties, or no properties at all, could be the intrinsic bases of physical properties, and 
physical properties are identified simply by their relational, extrinsic properties. If this is right, 
then even though he changes the categorical bases of physical properties, he still manages to 
keep everything physical the same between the actual world and the zombie world while keeping 
the causal efficacy of mental properties in the actual world.  
 There are at least two places where we can raise doubt about this account. First, it is 
unclear that Chalmers can justifiably say that physical properties are identified solely by their 
relational, extrinsic properties. Chalmers argues that “it seems reasonable to say that there is still 
mass in the zombie world” when the intrinsic features of mass are changed, but this is like saying 
there is still water in Putnam’s Twin earth. If a thing consisting of XYZ is not water even if it 
behaves exactly like water (Putnam 1973), how can we say a thing consisting of a different 
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intrinsic feature than mass is still mass even though it behaves exactly like mass? If this is right, 
then Chalmers commits a similar mistake here as in his first solution by failing to keep the actual 
world and the zombie world physically identical. While with the first method he changes the 
relational features of the physical, with the second one he changes the intrinsic features of the 
physical.   
 Of course, water is a kind of substance and mass is a kind of property, so there is a 
category difference in these two cases. One might then argue that even though at non-
fundamental categories, the composition of an entity is essential for its identity, it might be the 
case that at the fundamental level, what is essential is only the relational features, and at the 
intrinsic features are not essential for the identity of fundamental physical entities. For example, 
the identity of quarks, if it is not composed of any more fundamental entities, might depend only 
on its dispositional, relational properties. While this is certainly possible, it seems implausible, 
for if they are not necessary for the identity of fundamental physical entities, then why introduce 
them in the first place? Since Chalmers allows that there be no categorical bases for physical 
entities without changing the identity of those physical entities, then there is no reason to 
suppose that they do have categorical bases in the actual world. The world would indeed seem 
“insubstantial,” but there is nothing wrong with being insubstantial, for we do not observe 
substantiality anyway, and being substantial is almost trivial for being physical. If this is right, 
then this move to maintain the identity of physical entities after changing its categorical bases 
undermines the motivation to introduce categorical bases of physical entities.  
 Now, even if intrinsic features are not essential to the physical, Chalmers still faces a 
more serious problem, which is that the causal efficacy that phenomenal properties gain on this 
account does not really enable one to deny epiphenomenalism while maintaining completeness. 
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Chalmers claims that phenomenal properties inherit causal efficacy from proto-phenomenal 
properties, but what is this inherited causal efficacy like? If it is full-blown efficacy that makes a 
physical difference, then completeness is wrong, for some physical effects would only have 
mental causes. If it is not full-blown efficacy, then it cannot account for our intuition against 
epiphenomenalism that our mental experience does play a causal role. The intuition we have in 
the reporting problem is that normal phenomenal properties seem to cause physical events and 
make a physical difference, which necessarily contradicts completeness if one accepts dualism. 
Therefore, there is no satisfactory way to expand the logical space of the causal closure problem. 
Since we reject epiphenomenalism, one has to adopt an interactionist account for dualism to be 
true. 
 
 
Part 2: Why dualism in the first place? 
 Now that we have seen that it is more reasonable to believe in interactionist dualism than 
non-interactionist dualism (epiphenomenalism or Russellian panprotopsychism), the task 
remains to show that it is more reasonable to believe in dualism than physicalism. In this section 
I will offer what I call the interactionist argument for dualism. This argument is a modified 
version of the zombie argument. The zombie argument tries to argue that no mental properties 
supervene on physical properties by constructing a possible world in which no mental properties 
are instantiated. However, the possibility of the zombie world entails that removing mental 
properties has no physical effect in the actual world, and therefore the zombie world is actually 
not possible because epiphenomenalism is false in the actual world. Though the zombie 
argument does not disprove physicalism, we need to note that physicalism is a rather fragile 
16 
 
claim, as any mental property that does not supervene on physical properties can prove it wrong. 
Therefore, I argue against physicalism by constructing a possible world in which only one 
mental property is absent. 
 
The Interactionist Argument 
 The interactionist argument tries to have only one mental property not instantiated in a 
possible world (I select pain arbitrarily), and if this argument shows that this one mental property 
does not supervene on physical properties, then physicalism is false.  
 Since it is argued above that epiphenomenalism is false, then what is going on in our 
mind plays a causal role, and, for example, the pain that I feel causes me to shout, “Ouch!” Let’s 
then conceive of a world A, where physical and mental facts remain as similar to the actual 
world as logic allows. World A and the actual world have the same physical properties and 
substances (e.g. mass, charge, quarks, stones), and they have the same physical laws. Plants grow 
and water (H2O) flows as in the actual world. The essential difference between the two worlds is 
that whereas pain (call it M) is instantiated in the actual world, it is not in world A. Other mental 
properties are still instantiated in world A, so some animals (say prehistoric fish or birds, though 
we are not sure whether it is earlier, simpler organisms that first experience pain; humans would 
likely not evolve due to their ancestors’ lack of reaction to pain) still have phenomenal 
experiences, but no conscious beings feel pain at all. World A then differs physically from the 
actual world at least in that it does not have the physical events that pain brings about. For 
example, the sensation of pain when coming really close to fire in the actual world causes birds 
to avoid coming so close to fire in the future, but in world A, presumably, they do not avoid 
doing so even after coming close to fire for the first time. Of course, the physical difference that 
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the absence of pain causes will probably cause other physical differences, making world A much 
different from the actual world, but that does not concern us. Again, a physicalist has to maintain 
that necessarily, whenever we have a mental property M (say pain) instantiated in an entity (e.g. 
a bird), we have a physical property P (say some sort of neuron firing) instantiated there, and 
necessarily, whenever P is instantiated in an entity, M is instantiated there as well. The aim of 
this argument is to show that it is possible that P is instantiated while M is not.  
 Now consider the first instantiation of pain (call it m1) in the actual world, which happens 
at t1. m1 is not present in world A, and the key work is to establish that the first instantiation of P 
(call it p1) is present in world A. As said earlier, we are keeping world A as similar to the actual 
world as logic allows. What logic does not allow is that while pain is not instantiated in world A, 
the physical effects of pain are present in world A, but whatever is not the effect of pain (or of 
the effects of pain) can be the same in both worlds. It is clear that p1 is not the effect of m1 or of 
the effect of m1, since there is no reason to suppose causes (like p1) ever supervene on effects 
(like m1). Therefore, p1 can be safely stipulated to be present in world A. With the same 
reasoning, we can conclude p1 is not the effect of the effects of m1.  
 If this is right, then it is perfectly conceivable that p1 is instantiated in a world where m1 
is not instantiated, and if conceivability entails possibility, M does not supervene on P and 
property dualism is true in the actual world. The overall argument is formalized as follows:  
1. It is conceivable to have p1 (some particular sort of neuron firing) without m1 (the 
first instantiation of pain). 
2. Whatever is conceivable is possible. 
3. It is possible to have p1 without m1. 
4. Therefore, pain does not supervene on neuron firing. 
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5. Therefore, property dualism is true. 
 This new argument acknowledges the causal efficacy of mental properties and therefore 
avoids epiphenomenalism. At the same time, this argument does not change the identity of p1 in 
world A, since neither its causal relation nor its intrinsic feature needs to be altered in world A in 
order for world A to be possible. It therefore avoids the same kind of problem the zombie 
argument faces, that, as Bailey complains, by stipulating the physical events to be the same, 
Chalmers changes the identity of the physical events already.  
 
Dualist Accounts of Mental Causation 
 With an argument for interactionist dualism in hand, now we need to explain what mental 
causation is like. After all, our current understanding of causation is mostly about physical 
causation, and it is important to provide a coherent, plausible account of causation and to show 
how mental causation is different from physical causation, if different at all. 
 One cannot avoid discussing energy when discussing causation. Most, if not all, cases of 
physical causation seem to involve energy. A frequently used example of physical causation is 
when one billiard ball hits another one; in this case, energy from the first billiard ball transfers to 
the second one.  An important aspect of energy is the conservation of energy (henceforth CoE), 
which states that in a closed system, i.e. a system which does not exchange energy with other 
systems, the total amount of energy always remains the same. CoE is a well-established physical 
law, and physicalists question how mental causation is possible, given that our universe is a 
closed system in which energy is conserved. Now, CoE itself is logically compatible with 
interactionist dualism, so attackers need to add additional premises to reject dualism. Ben White 
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suggests that one such premise could be “any change in a body’s motion involves some 
transference of energy between the cause of the change and the body whose movement is altered” 
(2017:389), but he also points out that this is not quite enough, for if one allows mental causes to 
possess energy, the contradiction would vanish. Therefore, White further suggests that one more 
premise be added, either that “nothing non-physical has energy (or at least none that is capable of 
being transferred to any physical body) or … that the physical realm constitutes a closed system 
(i.e., one that exchanges no matter or energy with its surroundings, and on which no external 
force acts)” (ibid.). The first option rules out any mental energy at all, or at least energy that 
would interact with the physical; the second one prevents the physical from interacting with 
anything non-physical, including anything mental.  
 Essentially, both statements deny that the mental can interact with the physical, at least 
not by means of energy. Therefore, dualists need to show either that the mental and the physical 
can indeed interact by means of energy, or that they can interact by some other means. To make 
the task clearer, dualists are dealing with this set of incompatible claims: 
e. Our universe is a closed system that conserves energy.  
f. Any change in a body’s motion involves some transference of energy between the cause 
of the change and the body whose movement is altered. 
g. Nothing non-physical has energy (or at least none that is capable of being transferred to 
any physical body). 
h. Mental states can cause a body’s motions. 
 Among these claims, (e) is well supported by scientific evidence, but (f) and (g) are not. 
To save (h), dualists can therefore either reject (f) and claim that the mental can cause a body’s 
motion without itself possessing energy or transferring energy to the body, or reject (g) and claim 
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that the mental can possess energy and thus interact with the physical by means of energy. I will 
discuss the second option first, as this is the approach White takes. I believe White’s approach is 
a possible explanation of mental causation, but it is implausible and the first option is the better 
way for dualists to take. 
 
Can the Mental Possess Energy? 
 The starting point of White’s approach is that “it is unclear how something could exert a 
force without possessing energy” (2017:391). He does not explicitly explain the reason he 
believes so, but in a later section, he claims “energy is partly defined in terms of force (for 
energy is the capacity to do work or transfer heat, and work is the application of force to a body 
that results in the displacement of that body in the force’s direction)” (392). The idea seems to be 
that the concepts of energy, work, and force are closely related, and these concepts are essential 
to our understanding of how causation works. Many theories of causation would support his 
claim as well. For example, a version of the conserved quantity theory claims that “a causal 
interaction is an intersection of world lines which involves exchange of a conserved quantity” 
(Dowe 1995:323). On this view, if the mental has a causal interaction with the physical, the 
mental must transfer a conserved quantity to the physical, namely a conserved amount of energy. 
In order to defend this position, White needs to make sense of mental energy.  
 A general worry is that energy is a property attributed to physical entities, and we have 
no account of energy possessed by non-physical entities. White argues that “there is no reason 
why a non-physical entity could not be ascribed a physical quantity if such an ascription were 
warranted by certain effects that it was found to have upon some physical system” (2017:391). 
The idea is that if dualism is true and after a mental event, the total amount of energy possessed 
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by physical entities is found increased, then it seems more reasonable to suppose that there is 
energy possessed by non-physical entities as well, instead of rejecting CoE immediately. We do 
not have a definitive reason to suppose that only physical entities can possess energy, and the 
transferability of this quantity possessed by non-physical entities to energy possessed by physical 
entities suggests that the quantity is energy as well.  
 While this account does address some worries, it nonetheless has a serious problem. First, 
White does not clarify whether “energy possessed by physical entities” and “energy possessed by 
non-physical entities” are numerically identical to each other. It seems that this should be the 
case, for they are unified by the same CoE. Just like how chemical energy and kinetic energy are 
both energy, only in different forms, “energy possessed by physical entities” and “energy 
possessed by non-physical entities” should also both be energy, only possessed by two different 
kinds of entities.  
 However, White grants in a footnote that “on the assumption that while non-physical 
entities might possess energy, they cannot possess mass, the energy possessed by non-physical 
entities would have to differ from that possessed by physical entities at least in the respect that 
when possessed by non-physical entities, it is not equivalent with mass” (ibid.). Now this is 
puzzling. Energy is equivalent to mass whether in the form of chemical energy or in the form of 
kinetic energy, but this explanation suggests that while energy is equivalent to mass when 
possessed by physical entities, it is not equivalent to mass when possessed by non-physical 
entities. How could this be? To say that energy possessed by non-physical entities and that 
possessed by physical entities are the same energy would violate the indiscernibility of identicals, 
roughly the principle that a and b are numerically identical only if they have exactly the same 
properties. If this is right, then it seems energy possessed by non-physical entities and that 
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possessed by physical entities cannot be numerically identical, and White is positing a new 
category of beings, namely mental energy, instead of simply energy possessed by non-physical 
entities. This new kind of energy would be fundamentally different from physical energy that is 
equivalent to mass, but somehow mental energy could transfer to physical entities and transform 
to physical energy that is equivalent to mass, and mental energy and physical energy are 
regulated by the same CoE despite their fundamental difference. This seems highly implausible, 
if not completely impossible. White’s note therefore at least contradicts himself, and in order to 
make sense of mental causation, dualists have to adopt another approach. 
 
Can the Mental Have Physical Effects Without Itself Possessing Energy?  
 Since White’s account is unlikely to be true, how exactly can the mental have physical 
effect, if not by means of energy? Let’s take the example of me speaking the word “Pizza” when 
asked what my favorite food is. This is a physical event/effect that transfers the energy stored in 
my body into kinetic and thermal energy. Between the event someone asking the question and 
me speaking the word, there are also some intermediate causes. To describe the whole causal 
chain in more detail, and from the perspective of an interactionist dualist, the man’s voice when 
asking the question causes certain vibration of my eardrums; some brain states about the sound 
input taken then happen; my mental representation of the information is formed; I then have an 
intention to speak; then some brain state that instructs the vocal muscles to move happens; and 
finally electrical signals are sent to the muscles, my mouth moves, and my vocal folds vibrate.  
Now the fine-grained part of the mental causation here is the conscious, mental state of 
intention causes some brain state that instructs the vocal muscles to move. More specifically, the 
brain state is an electric signal forming and travelling from the central nervous system to the 
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peripheral nervous system. This electric signal requires energy to form and travel, but does the 
energy have to come from the mental cause? The answer is negative, for the chemical energy 
stored in the body is already sufficient. This is different from cases of physical causation, e.g. a 
billiard ball hitting another one. In this case of physical causation, the cause provides the energy 
required for the effect, but in the case of mental causation, the body provides the energy required 
for the effect. The mental cause only functions to trigger the transformation from chemical 
energy to electrical and kinetic energy, and it is not clear that this triggering necessarily requires 
energy. If this is true, then energy transference from the cause to the effect is not required for all 
cases of causation. As White mentions, C. D. Broad first claims that mental causes “determine 
that at a given moment so much energy shall change from the chemical form to the form of 
bodily movement; and they determine this, so far as we can see, without altering the total amount 
of energy in the physical world” (1925:109). This way, we have a coherent account of mental 
causation without attributing energy to mental entities. 
It is noteworthy that I do not argue that all cases of apparent mental causation are actually 
cases of mental causation. For all we know according to the best of science, many of our actions 
are not at all caused by any conscious activity. Maybe my description of the above case is wrong. 
Maybe no mental intention is needed for me to spontaneously speak the word, which might not 
be caused by anything mental. But my thesis is rather that at least some cases of apparent mental 
causation involve intermediate mental causes, and without these mental causes, the physical 
effects would not happen. It does seem that at least in cases of self-reporting, the involvement of 
conscious activity as the cause is required. Can I really say “I believe it is 8 o’clock in the 
morning” when my belief that it is 8 o’clock in the morning is not the cause? The same intuition 
24 
 
we have about epiphenomenalism applies here. If this is right, then we have good reason to 
believe that there are some cases where mental states have physical effects. 
 The biggest challenge for this account is that we do not know how this causal relation 
works. I claim that mental properties can trigger physical energy transformation and transference 
without energy, but I have not provided an account of how this “triggering” works. In a case of 
physical causation, e.g. a signal from the central nervous system causing a body movement, we 
explain the causal relation by means of energy, claiming that it is the energy carried by the signal 
which transfers to the muscles that triggers the body movement. In my example of mental state 
causing a signal to form and travel, however, we have no explanation of what triggers this signal 
to form and travel. Process theorists, e.g. conserved quantity theorists, would therefore contend 
that this account is not plausible because there is no exchange of a conserved quantity, i.e. 
energy, between the cause and the effect that serves the triggering role.  
 However, this objection can stem simply from our ignorance of the nature of causal 
processes in general. This response presupposes that there is only one kind of causal process, that 
which physicalists understand it to be. But imagine a possible world where only two states of 
affairs obtain, namely a mental (non-physical) state and a physical brain state. The mental state 
does not possess any energy, but by some weird natural law in that world (and there is indeed a 
law), and through some weird process different than energy transference, that mental state 
“influences” and “gives rise to” the occurrence of that physical state. Now, the question for 
process theorists is as follows: given that there is a process (though a weird one), by what right 
could one deny that this is a causal relation? Surely, we do not know yet about what the causal 
process is here, but it seems that the only thing the process theorists can say is that such 
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causation is not the physical causation we know of. Our ignorance of possible causal processes 
cannot warrant a rejection of unknown causal processes.  
 Think about mental causes and mental effects. My beliefs that if P then Q and that P 
cause my belief that Q. What is the process behind this case of causation? What triggers the 
formation of my belief that Q? We really have no idea, and we cannot explain this mental-mental 
causation just by saying that beliefs are mental and of course they can have causal effect on each 
other, just as we cannot explain physical causation just by saying they are physical. Still, it is not 
reasonable to say that therefore, a mental belief cannot cause another belief. Rather, we say that a 
mental belief can cause another even though we do not know about the causal process behind 
this causal relation. In that case, since it is reasonable to suppose that there is a causal process 
that we do not know of in the case of mental-mental causation, it is also reasonable to suppose so 
in the case of mental-physical causation as well. Therefore, this account of mental causation 
without appealing to energy is still plausible. 
  
The Place of Mental State in Nature 
Chalmers holds naturalistic dualism, roughly the idea that mental states naturally, or 
nomologically, supervene on physical brain states. The problem with this account is that if 
mental states were to supervene on physical brain states, then it seems mental states are causally 
efficacious not in virtue of themselves, but in virtue of the physical brain states. If you remove 
the mental states, nothing physical would change, which is contradictory to our intuition about 
quepiphenomenalism, the idea that mental states do not make a physical difference (whether they 
are causally efficacious or not). Therefore, if the interactionist account is right, then it is not the 
case that mental states somehow emerge from brain states according to natural laws, or the case 
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that whenever you have a mental state, you also have a brain state at the same time. Mental states 
are caused by brain states, and they cause brain states as well. They just do not naturally 
supervene on brain states. 
Is this already disproved by science, or can science tell us that there is always some brain 
state when you have a mental state? I think not. While I do think we have strong evidence for the 
correlation between mental and brain states, we might not have any evidence to suppose that this 
correlation is supervenience or causation. To acquire such evidence, you need to determine 
whether the mental states and the brain states are simultaneous. If we discover that they are 
indeed simultaneous, then we would have strong evidence for the supervenience claim. However, 
the only way you can know when a mental state happens is by self-reporting, but self-reporting 
of time can never be exact. Humans have a reaction time, and however close the reported time 
when the mental state happens and the recorded time when the brain state happens are, we 
cannot be sure whether they happen at the same time or not. After all, the time between the cause 
and the effect might just be a few milliseconds, probably far shorter than human reaction time. 
Therefore, it is difficult to see how we can ever determine whether the mental supervenes on the 
physical by determining the time which correlation between mental and brain states is. Therefore, 
to reject interactionist dualism, physicalists need to find other weakness in the argument and 
account. 
 
Objections to the Interactionist Argument and Interactionist Dualism 
 When Perry and Bailey attack the zombie argument, they say that zombies are 
inconceivable because it entails epiphenomenalism in the actual world. The interactionist 
argument does not face this problem, but physicalists, especially identity theorists, can still argue 
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that world A is not conceivable either because in the actual world, mental properties are identical 
to physical properties, and therefore when you remove pain, you remove something physical 
already. Some also deny that conceivability entails possibility using Saul Kripke’s idea of a 
posteriori necessity. As Chalmers himself has mentioned, “it is often said that sentences such as 
‘water is not H2O’ provide counterexamples to the claim that conceivability entails possibility: it 
is conceivable that water is not H2O, but it is not metaphysically possible” (2010:145). Therefore, 
apparently, we have an example of something conceivable but impossible. One thing to notice 
here, though, is the claim that water is necessarily H2O is an identity claim. Chalmers generally 
addresses the second objection with the two-dimensional argument, which is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. I will instead focus on the first objection based on identity theories. 
 To respond to this objection, I want to turn to the motivation for identity theories and 
point out that these theories are brought up because of and justified by a belief in physicalism. 
According to Kim, there are three positive arguments for physicalism in general or identity 
theories in specific. I want to raise doubt for all three arguments for physicalism and thereby 
diminish the threat to dualism and the interactionist argument by identity theories.  
 The first two argue for identity theories directly. “The first, originally promoted by Smart 
without much elaboration, is the simplicity argument, to the effect that identifying mental states, 
including states of consciousness, with neural/physical states of the brain, helps us attain the 
simplest, most parsimonious worldview” (Kim 2005:124). However, as Kim correctly points out, 
“[w]hat a physicalist may seize upon as the most parsimonious and elegant ontology would be 
apt to strike the dualist as a hopelessly inadequate scheme which discards, or ignores, the entities 
that are needed to save the phenomena” (ibid.:125). This simplicity argument is therefore not 
able to support strong theses like the identity theories on its own. 
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 The other argument is what Kim calls the explanatory argument. Kim specifies two kinds 
of the explanatory argument in his (2005) book. The first one is advanced by Christopher Hill 
and Brian McLaughlin. The central idea is that, based on inference to the best explanation, the 
best explanation for the correlation between mental and brain states is that they are identical, and 
therefore an identity theory is probably true (or we have good reason to believe that it is true). 
Against this argument, Kim brings up at least four points. First, Kim suggests that “[e]ven if we 
were to grant that type physicalism is to be preferred over its rivals, the warrant it enjoys might 
be far from sufficient for it to merit our ‘outright’ belief or acceptance” (ibid.:128). An identity 
theory might indeed best explain the correlation between mental and brain states, but it is not 
clear that its explanatory power is so strong that it is sufficient for us to believe the theory. 
Sometimes, when we compare two theories explaining the same phenomena, one might only be 
slightly better than the other, and this slight advantage might not be able to grant a belief in that 
theory. 
 Second, when we apply the principle of inference to the best explanation, the best theory 
should not only best explain the correlation between mental and brain states, but also other issues 
in philosophy of mind. For example, dualism seems to best explain the possibility of the zombie 
world or that of the qualia inversion. When comparing the explanatory power over all relevant 
issues, identity theories do not have a clear advantage over dualism. Third, the data that theories 
explain are changing constantly. Future data can influence how strong the explanatory power of 
a theory is, and therefore new data could undermine identity theories’ explanatory power. Fourth, 
Kim argues that a reduction to identity is not really an explanation of correlation. It is simply a 
reiteration of existing phenomena. He uses the example of Tully, who is identical to Cicero. If 
Tully is wise, then we can safely claim that Cicero is wise, but this is not an explanation of why 
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Tully is wise. It only restates the fact that Tully is wise in a different way. Therefore, Kim 
believes this version of explanatory argument cannot support the identity theories. 
 Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker adopt a quite different version of the explanatory 
argument, claiming that “acceptance of [some] identities is sufficiently justified because they 
enable explanations that mere correlations could not yield” (ibid. 141). For example, we have a 
good physiological explanation of how a particular brain state causes another brain state. If we 
identify pain with the former state and stress with the latter, then we have a good explanation of 
how pain can cause stress. This account looks nice at first, but Kim points out that in this picture, 
the work of explanation is done by neuropsychology, and the only thing identity theories do is to 
redescribe in folk vocabulary a phenomenon that has already been explained [in 
neuropsychology]” (ibid. 146). The above example seemingly explains how pain causes stress, 
but in fact it only states in a different way (the colloquial way) the fact that a certain brain state 
causes another brain state. Therefore, nothing new is explained by identity theories, and without 
any explanatory power, identity theories are not well supported. 
 Based on the objections above, Kim believes the causal argument is the way for 
physicalists to go. The causal argument argues for physicalism in general and is basically the 
causal closure problem I have described in Part 1: given that completeness is true, that 
epiphenomenalism is false, and that systematic overdetermination is false, physicalism must be 
true. Therefore, the strongest support for identity theory lies in completeness, the very thesis 
dualists have to deny in the causal closure problem. The remaining task is then to argue that even 
completeness is not as strong as physicalists believe it to be, and therefore that there is no 
adequate positive argument for physicalism or identity theories.  
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 In his essay “The Rise of Physicalism,” David Papineau explains two popular arguments 
for the completeness of physics based on empirical findings:  
 (1) The Argument from Fundamental Forces. The first argument is that all 
apparently special forces characteristically reduce to a small stock of basic 
physical forces that conserve energy. Causes of macroscopic accelerations 
standardly turn out to be composed out of a few fundamental physical forces that 
operate throughout nature. So, while we ordinarily attribute certain physical 
effects to ‘muscular forces,’ say, or indeed to ‘mental causes,’ we should 
recognize that these causes, just as all causes of physical effects, are ultimately 
composed of the few basic physical forces.  
(2) The Argument from Physiology. The second argument is simply that there is 
no direct evidence for vital or mental forces. Physiological research reveals no 
phenomena in living bodies that manifest such forces. All organic processes in 
living bodies seem to be fully accounted for by normal physical forces. (2001:27) 
Both arguments, in my opinion, are not as strong as people think they are. The first 
argument claims that upon examining the history of science, all apparently special forces reduce 
to a few basic physical forces that conserve energy, so it is reasonable to suppose that mental 
forces would reduce to some fundamental physical forces as well. However, we need to note that 
“force” is not synonymous to “cause.” As I have discussed in a previous section, mental states 
can be causally efficacious without having any energy or force. This argument, therefore, at best 
shows that all forces can be reduced to fundamental physical forces. It does not show that all 
causes are ultimately physical causes. 
The second argument claims that science (especially physiology) has yet to discover any 
mental or non-physical forces, so there is no reason to suppose there are any. Besides my last 
point that mental states can be causally efficacious without having energy or force, we can also 
argue that even if we have not found mental causes in any scientific research, this still does not 
provide enough evidence against mental causes. As White accurately points out, “our scientific 
understanding of the inner workings of the brain is currently still in its initial stages” (2017:397). 
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Physiology and neuroscience are still very young disciplines, and it is still quite possible that 
there be new discovery of mental causes in the future. Maybe in the future we would discover 
that without a certain mental state, some physical state would not happen. Even though the 
current evidence is probably enough to justify the inclination to believe that all forces are 
physical, it is not enough to argue against the possibility of undiscovered mental causes, as 
Papineau attempts to do. Therefore, this argument also fails to support the completeness of 
physics. 
 I have shown above that the three positive arguments are not all strong as physicalists 
believe they are, and therefore we have less reason to think identity theories are true. Since there 
is no definitive rejection of identity theories either, now we have a somewhat mutually question-
begging situation. Interactionist dualists claim that mental states are not identical to physical 
brain states, and identity theorists claim otherwise. Which side you support largely depends on 
how strong you believe in the three arguments vs. how strong you believe in your intuition that 
the mental is not physical. It seems to me that neither can give a knock-down argument against 
the other. However, given how prevailing physicalism is in contemporary philosophy, this is 
already a progress for interactionist dualism. Furthermore, since dualism can accommodate both 
the scientific evidence that is supposed to support completeness, and our intuition about the mind, 
dualism seems to have a stronger explanatory power.  
 
Conclusion 
 The two starting points of interactionist dualism are: 1) mental states are NOT physical 
and 2) mental states have causal efficacy in the physical world, that is, their presence makes a 
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physical difference. When one only believes the first proposition, he can be a physicalist and say 
minimally that mental states supervene on physical brain states. When one only believes the 
second claim, he can be an identity theorist and say mental states just are physical brain states. 
However, physicalists cannot believe both propositions, for given that mental states supervene on 
physical brain states, it seems the causal efficacy belongs to the physical brain states, and 
removing mental states does not seem to make a difference to the physical world. This honors 
thesis also respects scientific discoveries about the mind, and I have argued above that scientific 
discoveries do not provide sufficient reasons to support the completeness of physics or to reject 
either of the above propositions, and that it is more reasonable to believe in interactionist dualism.  
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